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NATIONAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE CRIMEAN TATAR CASE.(U)
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
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NATIONAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION:
THE CRIMEAN TATAR CASE

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If those interested in Soviet affairs were to confine their reading to the official Soviet press, they would perhaps conclude that all is quiet behind the Soviet front. However since a large body of underground literature has reached the West in recent years, observers have learned of numerous protest activities against the Soviet regime by various groups in the USSR. We know, for example, that liberal intellectuals are criticizing the Soviet leadership for its rigid control over the literary and scientific life of the country. Various religious groups are protesting against the closure of churches, imprisonment of believers, and restrictions on baptisms, proselyting, and religious instruction of the young. Similarly, certain members of national minorities are demanding more linguistic, educational, and cultural autonomy for their nations. Some of these minority nationalities, such as the Jews, Volga Germans, and Meskhi, have formed repatriation movements in order to obtain permission to settle in those areas which they regard as their homelands.

The "Return to the Homeland Movement" of one of these ~~minority nationalities~~, the Crimean Tatars, is the principal subject of this article. Whereas Western observers have generally focused their attention on Russian and Jewish dissidents in the Moscow area, they have given somewhat less consideration to protesting members of other nationalities in other parts of the Soviet Union. Therefore a description of Crimean Tatar dissidence provides an opportunity to demonstrate that national dissent is more widespread (and as will be seen, more violent) than is perhaps generally believed. Here it might also be mentioned that we cannot view dissent from Crimean Tatars in isolation from the other currents of dissent mentioned above. Therefore when Crimean Tatar activities are known to have merged with those of other dissidents throughout the USSR, the occurrences will be noted.

It is useful to bear in mind that the present dissidence of the Crimean Tatars is merely a modern-day form of their past resistance to coercion and their determination to secure their national rights. Therefore a brief treatment of the history of the Crimean Tatars, and particularly their opposition to Russian domination, ~~seems warranted~~ is discussed.

The present-day Crimean Tatar nation of less than one-half million is descended from Turco-Kipchak race of Tatars who settled

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in the Crimea and who formed an administrative province of the Golden Horde in the thirteenth century. Later in the fifteenth century they came under the suzerainty of the more powerful Turks, with whom they are bound by language, blood, and religion. Throughout this period they frequently made raids deep into Russian territory. These incursions were halted, however, in 1783 when during the reign of Catherine the Great Russian troops seized the Crimea. Following the Russian victory, the Tatars began to suffer certain deprivations. Lands were expropriated and Tatar place names were replaced with Greek ones. As hopes of winning back their independence from the Russians dimmed throughout the nineteenth century, many Crimean Tatars migrated to Turkey. As a result of the emigration, by the beginning of the twentieth century the Tatars had become a minority in their Crimean homeland.

Hopes were raised, however, when a national liberation movement, begun in 1883 by Ismail Bey Gaspirali (Gasprinsky), assumed revolutionary forms.² Shortly after the Russian Revolution the Tatar rebels were able to attain their objective of full independence, when in December 1917 a national Crimean republic was formed. When the peninsula was eventually incorporated into Soviet Russia, however, the Crimean Tatars' sovereignty came to an end.

On the other hand, the Crimean Tatars were granted a certain degree of autonomy by the new Soviet State. On October 18, 1921 the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) was established. The Crimean Tatar language was recognized as a state language on the same footing as Russian; many government positions were given to Crimean Tatars; and national schools, newspapers, and theatres were founded. This relative autonomy, however, was later seriously curtailed by severe repressions under Stalin. In response to his policies, when World War II began, many Crimean Tatars joyfully greeted the invading German Army and volunteered for service in it. Tatars enrolled in six national volunteer battalions and, in all, about 20,000 men took up arms.³ Others, however, joined the Red Army, and many were awarded military decorations.⁴

After the Soviets reconquered the peninsula, the Crimean Tatars were deported, a fate which was meted out also to the Volga Germans and other small nations, such as the Chechens and Karachay. In May of 1944, the entire Crimean Tatar population was loaded into cattle cars and transported to places of exile in the Urals and Central Asia. Thousands perished during the course of the deportation and in the prison camps to which they were sent. (According to an unofficial survey conducted in 1966 by representatives of the Crimean Tatar people, 46.3 percent of the population died in the course of 1944-45⁵) The Stalinist regime then took administrative measures to put an end to the official autonomy of the peninsula. Two years



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

February 6, 1980

Mr. Harry Schrecengost
Defense Technical Information
Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Va. 22314

Dear Mr. Schrecengost:

Permission is hereby granted to the Defense Technical Information Center to accession into its collection all the U.S. Department of State supported contract studies contained in the seven boxes obtained from the Foreign Affairs Research Documentation Center on February 6, 1980.

Permission is also granted to further disseminate these documents into the private sector through the National Technical Information Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Sincerely,

Edward N. Lundstrom
Research Documentation Officer
Office of External Research
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

after the deportation, the Crimean ASSR was liquidated by the Supreme Soviet. Finally in 1954 the peninsula became part of the Ukrainian Republic.

For twelve years the Crimean Tatars lived under a so-called "banishment regime" in their places of exile. According to regulations, they were restricted to the area to which they had been deported and were required to report to local authorities once a month. This situation was significantly altered, however, by that cataclysmic event in Soviet history, Khrushchev's "secret" de-Stalinization speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. The relative liberalization which followed the secret speech soon began to benefit the Crimean Tatars. Certain cultural activities were permitted and a newspaper in the Crimean Tatar language, Lenin Bayraghy (Leninist Banner), began to be published in Tashkent. Furthermore, soon after the Twentieth Congress the regime issued an ukase which abolished the banishment regime.⁶ For the exiles, this decree marked the beginning of their present-day struggle for national rights. Although the Crimean Tatars were not allowed to return to the Crimea, they began to develop a certain faith in the Party. They believed that Soviet officialdom sincerely desired their full rehabilitation and repatriation. Khrushchev's liberalized policy toward the Crimean Tatars, in effect, set off rising expectations exemplified in numerous political activities. Immediately after the decree was made known, the exiles began to send letters and petitions to Party and State officials. Crimean Tatar factory workers held mass meetings to discuss their national problems and propose solutions.⁸

About this time the Movement was joined by a Russian journalist, Alexei Kosterin, who had been released shortly before from sixteen years of servitude in labor camps. He began actively to support the Crimean Tatars after the publication of a Supreme Soviet decree of 1957 which rehabilitated all the deported nations except the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars. Kosterin, one of the first Russian intellectuals to come to the Crimean Tatars' defense, eventually served as a link between the Crimean Tatars and other Russian dissidents, as will be seen below.

The high expectations of the Crimean Tatars, however, were frustrated by the silence of the Soviet regime. Whereas the other deported nations were permitted to return to their homelands, the Crimean Tatars (and Volga Germans) were not. Several young Tatars reacted in protest. A militant and anti-Russian group, for example, was formed in Tashkent in late 1961. One of the gatherings which took place in February of 1962 has been described by Mustafa Dzhemilev, a nineteen year old Crimean Tatar student who had been asked by the group's members to present a lecture on their nation's history.

*P.J.S.
Little on file*

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On long benches in a small room sat about twenty-five young men and women, in the main students and workers from the city outskirts. Hot discussions were held, poems were read in Russian and Tatar, indignation was aroused by the unjust position of the Crimean Tatars Speakers criticized the existing conditions, expressed completely uncomplimentary epithets towards the "true Leninist," Khrushchev.

"Of course the young people, who in official literature had read that their forefathers were some sort of barbarians, traitors, and had always been defeated by the valiant Russians, enjoyed hearing the 'news' that the famous Tsar Peter I was soundly defeated . . . by Turkish Tatars . . . and that the Crimean Tatars over half of a millenium ago had an institution of higher learning."¹⁰

Plans were formulated for establishing a youth organization devoted to repatriation to the Crimea. After the organization had acquired a mass membership, the leaders would request official recognition, since their program was based on Leninist principles and their forms of activity were to be strictly constitutional. Indeed the Charter of the organization was modeled after that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The proponents of the plan envisioned collecting petitions to submit to Party officials and carrying out propaganda and field work among the Crimean Tatar population in order to arouse national consciousness and political activism. Money would be gathered for the purpose of sending delegations to Moscow. The organization was to have departments for communication, finance, and history; a special section would be set up for detecting provocateurs. Within a short time there were several "cells" scattered throughout educational institutions, factories, and elsewhere. But in April 1962, after only four such meetings, the KGB (secret police) broke up the gatherings. Four of the group's leaders were arrested on charges of forming a "Union of Crimean Tatar Youth" and possessing anti-Soviet and nationalistic propaganda. The authorities, presumably fearful of an alliance of some sort between the Crimean Tatars and other deprived nationalities, repeatedly asked the suspects if they had formed contacts with Chechens and Ingush. Eventually two of those arrested were convicted, and other participants in the "Union" were fired from their jobs.¹¹

Members of this particular group were fairly representative of those Crimean Tatars who would protest in the future. One first notices their relative youth. Of those arrested in 1961-70, two-thirds were under 34 years of age; roughly one-half were between the ages of 27 and 33. Second, the predominance of intellectuals and workers is observable. All of the 119 Crimean Tatars for whom we have

biographical data were engaged in either blue-collar industrial or white-collar intellectual jobs, with the former outnumbering the latter by almost two to one (65 percent to 35 percent). None were collective farmers or full-time Party officials, although 6 percent were rank-and-file Party members. Third, most of the dissidents lived in cities; almost three times as many resided in cities of over 50,000 population as in rural areas. Virtually all the protesters were from Uzbekistan, primarily from Tashkent (24 percent) and surrounding urban centers such as Chirchik, Angren, Andizhar, and Fergana; a lesser number lived in smaller towns, such as Bekabad and Yangiyul.

In spite of the arrests, the Crimean Tatars' spirit remained undaunted and in 1964 the Movement gathered strength.¹² An unofficial group of lobbyists to Moscow was formed to collate and formally present all letters and petitions to the authorities. The lobbyists also began to publish and distribute a regular bulletin (Informatsiya), in order to inform their constituents of conversations held with authorities in the capital and other events.¹³

In the following year special "Initiative Groups for Cooperation with the Party and Government in Solving the Crimean Tatar Nationality Problem" were formed. Besides holding regular meetings, these groups gathered petitions, collected money for the Moscow lobbyists and for members of the Movement who suffered repressions, and recorded acts of arbitrariness against their people. They also distributed this information to Crimean Tatars in areas of the USSR outside of Uzbekistan. The activists numbered over 5000.¹⁴

The impression one gets of a highly organized Movement is borne out by statistics. Twenty-seven percent of those arrested had engaged in some form of organizational activity, while the rest presumably had not. As might be expected, white-collar intellectual workers were twice as likely to be part of a dissident organizational structure than were blue-collar workers, indicating the former group's leadership role in the Movement.

On August 4, 1965, ten delegates of the Moscow lobby succeeded in obtaining an audience with the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Anastas Mikoyan, and other officials. (A similar meeting had been held in 1957 without results.) This time the representatives were told that the solution to the Crimean Tatar problem depended on the decision of higher Party officials. Although Mikoyan promised to act as intermediary and relay the results to the Crimean Tatar people, no answer materialized.¹⁵ In view of the impending Twenty-Third Party Congress in 1966, Crimean Tatars sent to Party and State authorities in Moscow some 14,284 individual and collective letters, altogether containing 180,000 signatures, with one petition

bearing the names of more than 120,000 individuals.¹⁶ In addition, many telegrams were sent to Moscow requesting that Party officials receive 125 Crimean Tatar lobbyists. Finally on March 28, on the eve of the Congress, Secretary Mikhail Georgadze of the Supreme Soviet Presidium received ten of the representatives and promised that the problem would be examined. He then asked the lobbyists to leave Moscow, a request with which the majority complied. By June, however, since no news had been heard from Moscow, many of the lobbyists began to return to the capital, but were quickly forced out of their hotels as soon as their nationality¹⁷ was discovered. Several arrests followed in the ensuing months.

The regime's coercive tactics, however, only spurred the Crimean Tatars to more intense activity. In October 1966 they held meetings in several cities and villages to prepare for the forty-fifth anniversary of the formation of the Crimean ASSR. However the gatherings were broken up by police, volunteer citizen militiamen, and, in some places, by Army troops. Nevertheless on October 18, the day of the anniversary, many Crimean Tatars went out to put forth their demands in the public arena. The following scene in Tashkent was typical of those in various cities of Central Asia.

Crimean Tatar students and young people intended to lay flowers and wreaths at Lenin's monument in Red Square. But . . . the monument was completely surrounded by a fence over three meters high. On both sides . . . stood two fire engines with water pumps ready for action. Then the young people went off to the other monument of Lenin on Theatre Square. But even here there were more policemen and KGB men than Crimean Tatars. Nevertheless, the young people succeeded in breaking the chain of police and, with cries of "Long live the Crimean Republic," in laying their flowers at the monument. An additional detail of police arrived and began to seize people. Several tens of young people were arrested.¹⁸

Between 1957 and 1967 the Crimean Tatars commissioned over 4000 delegates to Moscow and sent hundreds of thousands of letters to officials. Yet the lobbyists achieved no concessions and the letters remained unanswered. When Crimean Tatars engaged in mass demonstrations in Tashkent on August 27 and September 2, 1967, however, it appears that the regime was forced into responding to their demands.¹⁹ Thus in the September 9, 1967 issue of Pravda Vostoka, there suddenly appeared, without commentary, two government edicts which rehabilitated the "citizens of Tatar nationality who lived

in the Crimea" from treason in World War II. Although the decrees claimed that the Crimean Tatar nation had "struck root" in its present places of residence, nevertheless they confirmed its right to "live in any territory of the Soviet Union, in compliance with labor legislation and the passport regime."

The decrees, which suggested to the Crimean Tatars that repatriation was close at hand, intensified the nation's Drang nach Hause. The Crimean Tatars' expectations, however, were frustrated by the actual policies of the regime. The many Crimean Tatars who travelled to the Crimea found to their dismay that residents had been threatened with fines for renting or selling houses to Crimean Tatars.²⁰ Local officials had been forewarned not to register or employ Crimean Tatars. In the words of one authority, "The ukase wasn't issued for you Crimean Tatars, but for the press, moreover for the foreign press. Your homeland is Turkey--go there!"²¹ In summary, the thousands who attempted to resettle on the Crimean peninsula were, with the exception of a handful, all expelled.

However the disappointment was short-lived, which was due, in part at least, to the efforts of ex-Major General Pyotr Grigor-enko, a former cybernetics professor at the prestigious Frunze Military Academy. After his release from a psychiatric hospital to which he had been confined for political dissent, he was brought in to contact with national dissidents through his friendship with Alexei Kosterin. On the occasion of the latter's birthday on March 17, 1968 in Moscow, he delivered a rousing speech to over fifty Crimean Tatars in which he discussed their lack of success. He urged them not to request but to demand all of their human rights, including the establishment of a Crimean ASSR. He advocated using any means available, such as establishing their own press, demonstrating, and especially forming contacts with sympathetic members of other nationalities and seeking support from international organizations.²²

Although space does not permit a detailed elaboration of what occurred in 1968 following this occasion, we should mention briefly the events which took place in three locations: Chirchik, Moscow, and Crimea. In Chirchik the Crimean Tatars decided to time the celebration of their national spring festival "Dervize" with Lenin's birthday on April 21. Despite official prohibition, the festival was held in a city park, with national songs and music ringing out. At noon, however, the group was dispersed by police who beat the celebrants with rubber clubs and shot them with an alkaline solution out of fire hoses. (The liquid left white spots on clothing, thus enabling the police to identify the participants later.) The troops wore gas masks. Many Crimean Tatars were handcuffed and thrown into paddy wagons; by the end of the battle, which continued into the night, about 300 had been arrested.²³

The events in Moscow on May 18, the anniversary of the 1944 deportation, also deserve description. Some 800 Crimean Tatar representatives, including some from Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Northern Caucasus, had assembled with petitions demanding repatriation. Hotel managers in the capital, however, were ordered not to register any Crimean Tatars. On May 17-18 the police conducted a massive search throughout Moscow and immediately shipped those Crimean Tatars whom they arrested back to their homes in sealed railroad cars.²⁴ The arrests in Moscow had a significant psychological impact on the Crimean Tatars. The repression in the capital meant that they were no longer allowed access to the Soviet Union's political center. Their growing alienation was best described by G. T. Kasaeva, a Crimean Tatar invalid of World War II: "For citizens of the Crimean Tatar nationality, the capital is closed. [We experience only] document checks, police stations, interrogations."²⁵

Finally, the Crimea itself was alive with Tatar activities. On May 25, for example, several Crimean Tatars were arrested along the river Selgir near Simferopol for singing their national songs. The arrests took place in spite of protest from a crowd which had gathered to enjoy the entertainment.²⁶ Likewise, on May 26 a group of ninety-eight Crimean Tatars set up tents outside of Simferopol as a temporary camp until they might find work and housing. On the next day, however, they were surrounded by 250 KGB men, police, and militiamen. After a bloody battle with police, thirty-eight were deported to Baku. At one stop on the way, in Derbent in the Dagestan ASSR, a crowd of 2000 gathered and expressed their disapproval of these measures with shouts of "Free the innocent, you aren't kidding us!" When they learned that the prisoners were being transported without food or water, they took up a collection and donated the money to the travellers.²⁷ In June, finally, a police colonel attempted to arrest a group of Crimean Tatars who were sitting in a Simferopol park. Some members of other nationalities, however, made a tight ring around the Crimean Tatars and prevented their arrests.²⁸

These instances of external support prompted Crimean Tatar lobbyists in Moscow to write their constituents at the end of 1968 that a "new phase" had been reached in their Movement, since support had been gained from leading "progressive elements" of Soviet society.²⁹ (Nineteen sixty-eight, indeed, appears to have been a "banner year" of protest. Statistics show that 40 percent of the total number of arrests of Crimean Tatars in 1961-70 occurred in that year.) At Kosterin's funeral in Moscow in November, for example, at which representatives of the Chechens and Volga Germans also were present, virtually all the speakers expressed solidarity with the Crimean Tatar cause.³⁰ Members of the Soviet intelligentsia, including such prominent dissidents as Andrei Sakharov, had become

sympathetic with the Movement. Sakharov, in fact, mentioned their situation twice in his famous Memorandum and later wrote a samizdat ("self-published," underground) document entitled "On Discrimination against the Crimean Tatars."³¹ Crimean Tatar underground literature had spread to far-off areas such as Gorky and Kiev.³² Russian and Ukrainian farm workers in Crimea had stayed away from work or quit their jobs in protest against the regime's repressive treatment of the nation.³³ A samizdat document of May 1969 revealed the existence of a "Young International Committee of Solidarity with the Crimean Tatar Movement."³⁴ The news had also spread beyond the borders of the USSR. According to Grigorenko, "World opinion, especially in the Moslem world, began to speak indignantly of how a small nation was being subjected to cruel discrimination."³⁵ All of these instances prompted 115 Crimean Tatar representatives to write: "At the present time our national Movement already has the sympathy and support of thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, and representatives of other nationalities . . . and tomorrow there will be millions!"³⁶

At least one reason for the support which the Crimean Tatars received was their adoption of more diverse tactics. For example, a group of Crimean Tatars broke out of the 1969 May Day parade in Tashkent and unfurled a banner with the following slogan: "The Crimean Tatars have been in exile for twenty-five years--Communists! Return our people to their Homeland."³⁷ Crimean Tatar leaders, besides coming to the defense of "all political prisoners,"³⁸ strove to achieve greater solidarity with the Moscow intelligentsia by visiting writers, artists, scientists, and old revolutionaries in order to acquaint them with their national problem.³⁹ Also letters were written to the United Nations' Human Rights Commission and foreign Communist parties.⁴⁰

As a result of the Movement's growth, the authorities began to crack down more seriously, a trend which was signified most especially by the trial of ten Crimean Tatars in Tashkent. One of the defendants was the distinguished Rolan Kadyev, a professor at Samarkand University. At the Fifth World Conference on the Problems of the Theory of Relativity and Gravitation in Tbilisi in 1968, this thirty-one year old physicist had won international acclaim for his co-discovery of a new implication for the theory of relativity.⁴¹ (It is also interesting to speculate on the fact that Sakharov also was present at the Conference,⁴² but it remains unknown whether any contact took place between the two dissidents.)

At the trial of Kadyev and others on May 22, 1969, hundreds of Crimean Tatars were on hand to protest. As a result of the disorder which took place, the court proceedings had to be postponed.⁴³ When

sentences were finally handed down on August 5, some 500-700 protested by marching on Party headquarters. The demonstrators were joined by Uzbeks, Russians, Greeks, and others "who recognized their lawful demands."⁴⁴

The protest continued into the seventies. In April 1970 a large group of Crimean Tatars gathered in Moscow to pay homage to Lenin's centenary. One hundred and sixty were arrested.⁴⁵ In December 1972, in connection with the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR, 1,077 Crimean Tatar blue-collar workes signed a petition to the Politburo demanding the re-establishment of the Crimean ASSR and the reinstatement into the Party of those who had been expelled because of their activities in the Movement.⁴⁶ Some of the recent documents to reach the West are three appeals signed by 18,000, 20,000, and 60,000 members of the nation.⁴⁷ Finally we might note the large dossier of documents addressed in early 1973 to Rumanian Party chief Ceausescu and all Communist parties of the world, which included 105 pages of Crimean Tatar signatures.⁴⁸

The above description of the Crimean Tatar Movement reveals the rather familiar pattern of dissent: deprivation, expectation, frustration, and protest. In order better to understand the nature of the Crimean Tatars' activities, it would be useful to examine each of these stages in turn.

The Crimean Tatars' deprivation, as we have seen, goes back almost two centuries. Expropriation of land, destruction of the material symbols of national identity, and even mass murder by Stalin have punctuated the history of the nation. More recently, the Crimean Tatars have seen that whereas other minority nationalities usually have their own union or autonomous republics, or at least the right to live in their homelands, they do not. This deprivation was naturally increased by the 1957 decree which rehabilitated all of the deported nations except the Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans. Furthermore, understandably proud of the fact that their economic development is higher than that of other minority nationalities in Central Asia,⁴⁹ the Crimean Tatars therefore feel even more deprived when they cannot secure at least the same national rights.

If deprivation is the foundation of rebellion, then frustrated expectations appear to be the building blocks. As soon as the controls of the banishment regime were lifted from the Crimean Tatars, hopes for equal treatment rose tremendously. Khrushchev's "liberal" de-Stalinization policy gave birth to the kind of "collective effervescence" noted by Durkheim. Mass meetings, petitions,

organizations--all characterized by faith in the Soviet leaders--resulted. Perhaps the most salient feature of this early period of Crimean Tatar activity was their willingness to cooperate, to work with rather than to put pressure on Soviet decision-makers. Because of their faith in the Party, they believed that both they and Soviet officials were working toward the same goal, full repatriation.

However these expectations were severely frustrated by the regime's silence and repression. On the basis of available evidence, we can conclude tentatively that suppression of Crimean Tatar dissidents has reached a high point. In 1972, for example, four Crimean Tatars were sentenced to death for allegedly collaborating with the Germans in World War II.⁵⁰

Why have Soviet officials decided to take such a hard line against this nation, whereas they have adopted a policy of laissez-faire or even of favoritism toward others? We can only speculate, but undoubtedly the historical factor plays an important role. At times in the past, the Crimean Tatars not only have dominated over Russians and collaborated with their enemies, but have never lost their ability to organize against Russian power, in spite of large-scale emigration and death. Were the Crimean Tatars to return to the Crimean peninsula en masse, Soviet leaders would undoubtedly feel that their position in the strategic Black Sea area would be jeopardized. The fact that Soviet officialdom often tells Crimean Tatar dissidents that they are not permitted to return to the peninsula because they are "traitors" tends to substantiate this hypothesis. Given the many instances of anti-Russian and anti-Soviet activities in Crimean Tatar history, then, it is understandable that the authorities view the nation's repatriation as a threat, albeit in the modern era perhaps an exaggerated one.

An influx of Tatars into the Crimea also could have, from the regime's standpoint, adverse domestic economic and political consequences. Crimean Tatars might possibly make claims for the return of their former property which is now largely owned by the State. Also, if the Russians and Ukrainians who now inhabit this scenic vacation and resort area were to feel their favored position threatened by a mass immigration of Crimean Tatars, they could conceivably withdraw some of their support from the Soviet leadership.

Finally, two factors give the regime a certain degree of latitude in pursuing their policy. First, the small size of the Crimean Tatar population enables the Soviet leadership both to frustrate their demands with a minimum loss of support and to maintain control with a minimum degree of effort. We are told, for example, that Stalin would have deported the entire Ukrainian population after World War II were it not for the fact that the large

size of the Ukrainian population made the scheme unworkable. Thus for the regime the costs of refusing to allow the Crimean Tatars to repatriate are relatively low. Second, the lack of any significant support for the Crimean Tatars from abroad gives the regime a certain freedom from constraint. Whereas foreign pressure has forced Party and State leaders to permit Soviet Jews to emigrate, there has been little such support for the Crimean Tatars. Although a group of Tatars in the United States published a petition in the New York Times of June 18, 1973 supporting the reestablishment of the Crimean ASSR, it seems unlikely that such a small degree of foreign pressure can push Soviet officials into conceding full repatriation.

The intransigence of the regime has meant the intense frustration of the Crimean Tatars, leading them to form a well-organized protest Movement with almost universal participation and a remarkable degree of development. While the beginning of the Movement was characterized by faith in the Party, its present stage manifests cynicism as to the regime's goodwill. In contrast to its early extreme societal alienation and antipathy to the Russian nation, the Movement is now marked by contacts with members of other discontented nationalities and at least tentative alliance with segments of the liberal Russian intelligentsia. As a result of this increased support and loss of faith in Soviet officialdom, Crimean Tatar dissidence has both broadened and intensified.

Not only has their protest widened in geographic scope from Uzbekistan to the Crimea, Moscow, and other areas, but both the nature of their goals and the policies of the regime to be attacked have been significantly broadened. The Crimean Tatars have raised their sights from the initial target of repatriation to the goal of full expression of all aspects of their "national spirit." Similarly, protest against non-repatriation has been expanded to include dissent against discrimination in education, housing, and employment. Significantly, intellectuals such as Mustafa Dzhemilev and Yusuf Osmanov, a physicist from the scientific center of Serpukhov south of Moscow, have summarized the specific repressions against dissident activities and expressions of national identity as a general policy of Stalinism, racism, and physical and cultural genocide.⁵¹ Finally the Movement's tactics have become more intense, gradually shifting from requests to demands, from the politics of negotiation to that of confrontation, from hesitancy to violent battles with the police.

And the future? It is true that there are factors militating against further growth of the Movement. First, any support of the Crimean Tatars from Russian and other intellectuals probably will tend to be sporadic. Support of nations which fought against the

Russian Homeland in World War II lays Russian intellectuals open to official and popular charges of collaborating with "traitors." This in turn makes it more difficult to secure popular support for their goal of liberalizing the Soviet political system. Second, the regime has been quite adept in the past at using the policies of divide-and-rule and carrot-and-stick manipulation to minimize opposition.

On the other hand, a certain section of the Russian intelligentsia has adopted the cause of minority nationalities as an integral part of its social "mission." As S. P. Pisarev, a Communist since 1920 and former political prisoner, stated,

This [issue of the Crimean Tatars and Volga Germans] is a question touching not only the unfortunate nationalities . . . It is an affair for all of us, a case in which the honor of our entire country is involved.⁵²

These intellectuals feel strongly that although one's primary duty is to humanity as a whole, service to men can be achieved only through devotion to one's own nation. Hence they believe that minority nationalities should be allowed freely to express their national identity and thus will probably continue to support them in the future. Second, judging from Crimean Tatar sources, the regime's divide-and-rule and carrot-and-stick tactics have been fruitless. Attempts to divide the Movement from within have been unsuccessful. Slander against dissident activists allegedly has met with an unsympathetic audience. Likewise, although minor concessions have been granted to the Crimean Tatars, such as instruction in the Crimean Tatar language in a handful of Uzbekistan schools beginning in 1971,⁵³ protest activity shows little sign of diminishing.

Finally, as we have seen, the Crimean Tatars have had a certain demonstration effect upon other minority nationalities in Central Asia and elsewhere. As of the beginning of 1971 almost 100 people in the region of Narabad in Tadzhikistan were arrested for organizing a Moslem protest movement. Although no links are known to exist between Crimean Tatars and these dissidents, the tactics of the two groups are similar.⁵⁴ Such protest from other minority nationalities, in turn, can have a reinforcing effect on the Crimean Tatar Movement.

To conclude, it appears that as long as the Crimean Tatars see their hope of repatriation as realizable in the near future, dissent is unlikely to disappear. Certainly the gains made by the Jewish emigration movement have kept Crimean Tatar hopes alive. To put the

matter in broader perspective, the numerous other indications of national dissidence in the Soviet Union, such as the bloody two-day riots in May 1972 in Lithuania, seem to indicate that dissent from minority nationalities will continue to be a disruptive force in Soviet society and a source of increasing pressure on the regime to liberalize.

NOTES

¹The study is based on Soviet sources, Western commentaries, and samizdat ("self-published," underground) material which has been written by the Crimean Tatars and other dissidents and which has reached the West through various channels. In order to present the characteristics of the Crimean Tatar Movement as accurately as possible, I have also performed a statistical analysis on biographical data concerning 119 Crimean Tatar dissidents arrested between 1961 and 1970 (Register of Those Convicted or Detained in the Struggle for Human Rights in the USSR: March 1953 to February 1971 /Munich: Radio Liberty Research, 1971/).

²Gaspirali became well-known as a prominent leader of the Pan-Turkic modernist movement in Russia. Especially active were the "Young Tatar," "Vatan," and Jadid movements.

³Edige Kirimal, The Tragedy of Crimea, reprinted from Eastern Quarterly, IV, No. 1 (1951), p. 8; see also League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR, ed., Captive Nations in the USSR (Munich: League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR, 1963), p. 47.

⁴League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR, ed., Captive Nations in the USSR, p. 47.

⁵"Transcript of the Tashkent Trial of Ten Crimean Tatars" (hereafter referred to as "Tashkent Trial"), July 1 to August 5, 1969, Radio Liberty Research Department Manuscripts (hereafter referred to as RL MSS), 402.

⁶Ukaz No. 27 of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on April 28, 1956. The decree is unavailable, which is probably due to its not being published.

⁷"Mournful Informatsiya," No. 69 (May 15-June 1, 1968), RL MSS, 396; Mustafa Sakhat, Letter to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, June 26, 1969, RL MSS, 495.

⁸"An All-People Protest of the Crimean Tatars," early 1969, RL MSS, 379.

⁹Pravda, February 12, 1957.

¹⁰Mustafa Dzhemilev, Letter to Grigorenko, November, 1968, RL MSS, 281.

¹¹Ibid., and "An All-People Protest of the Crimean Tatars," RL MSS, 379.

¹²Mustafa Dzhemilev, Letter to Grigorenko, RL MSS, 281.

¹³"An All-People Protest of the Crimean Tatars," RL MSS, 379; Chronicle of Current Events (hereafter referred to as Chronicle), No. 2 (June, 1968), RL MSS, 61.

¹⁴"An All-People Protest of the Crimean Tatars," RL MSS, 379.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.; "Appeal of the Crimean Tatar People," addressed to the World Conference of Communist and Worker Parties meeting in Moscow, May, 1969, RL MSS, 137.

¹⁸"An All-People Protest of the Crimean Tatars," RL MSS, 379.

¹⁹"Mournful Informatsiya," No. 69 (May 15-June 1, 1968), RL MSS, 396; Chronicle No. 2 (June, 1968), RL MSS, 61; "Appeal of the Crimean Tatar People to All Persons of Goodwill, to Democrats and to Communists," September, 1968, RL MSS, 397 (hereafter referred to as "To All Persons"); Chronicle No. 27 (October, 1972) (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1973).

²⁰"To All Persons," RL MSS, 397.

²¹Ibid.

²²"Speech to Crimean Tatar Representatives in Moscow," March 17, 1968, RL MSS, 76.

²³"An All-People Protest of the Crimean Tatars," RL MSS, 379; Mournful Informatsiya No. 69 (May 15-June 1, 1968), RL MSS, 396; and Chronicle No. 2 (June, 1968), RL MSS, 61.

²⁴"An Ail-People Protest of the Crimean Tatars," RL MSS, 379; Informatsiya (November, 1968), RL MSS, 307; "Appeal of the Crimean Tatar People," RL MSS, 137.

²⁵Letter to Brezhnev and others, June, 1968, RL MSS, 190.

²⁶Informatsiya (November, 1968), RL MSS, 307.

²⁷Letter to Brezhnev, RL MSS, 190.

²⁸Informatsiya (November, 1968), RL MSS, 307.

²⁹Informatsiya No. 82 (January 1, 1969), RL MSS, 86. It calls for the year of 1969 to be one of "united action."

³⁰P. G. Grigorenko, "In Memory of Alexei Yevgrafovich Kosterin," November, 1968, RL MSS, 109; Listener (London), May 15, 1969; Novoe Russko Slovo, November 16, 1968; International Herald Tribune, November 16-17, 1968; Reuter, November 14, 1968.

³¹Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom, trans. by the New York Times, with an Introduction, Afterword, and Notes by Harrison E. Salisbury (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1968), pp. 53 and 66; the second document, addressed to national police chief Shchelokov, is as yet unavailable in the West, but see Sakharov's "Afterword to 'A Recollected Note'" written in June, 1972, RL MSS, 1136-a. See also Programma Demokraticheskogo Dvizhenie Sovetskogo Soyuza (Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union) (Amsterdam: Herzen Foundation, 1970), p. 52; Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, First Letter to the UN Human Rights Commission, May, 1969, RL MSS, 126; Sakharov, V. F. Turchin, and R. A. Medvedev, Letter to Brezhnev and others, March 19, 1970, RL MSS, 360. The Political Diary as well, a scholarly journal of a group of top-level liberal intellectuals, carried a digest of S. P. Pisarev's samizdat article arguing for a solution to the Crimean Tatar problem (No. 67 /April, 1970/), RL MSS, 1011. Finally, the prestigious "Committee for Human Rights" called on authorities to restore the rights of the Crimean Tatars and other groups exiled by Stalin, April 21, 1972, RL MSS, 1130.

³²In Gorky statements on the Crimean Tatar issue unfavorable to the regime came out in a political interrogation of three accused of attempting to form an "anti-Soviet" organization; see Chronicle No. 13 (April, 1970), RL MSS, 375. The same Chronicle reports a letter of two Kievan intellectuals to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR to re-establish a Crimean Tatar ASSR in honor of the jubilee of Lenin who founded it in 1921; they state that

there is unfortunately not one government agency devoted to the Crimean Tatars' return. See also the report of the arrest of twenty-seven year old Yu. Melnik, a Leningrader from whose flat documents about the Crimean Tatars were confiscated, in Chronicle No. 26 (July, 1972) (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1972).

³³See for example Mustafa Dzhemilev, Letter to Grigorenko, RL MSS, 281; and Informatsiya (November, 1968), RL MSS, 307. In one case an arrested Crimean Tatar blue-collar worker, Ismail Yazydzhiev, was released after workers in his factory struck in protest; Le Monde (Paris), May 10, 1969.

³⁴RL MSS, 520.

³⁵Letter about the 1944 deportation, March 10, 1969, RL MSS, 152.

³⁶Original italics; "Mournful Informatsiya" No. 69 (May 15-June 1, 1968), RL MSS, 396.

³⁷"Appeal of the Crimean Tatar People," RL MSS, 137.

³⁸For example, Part IV of a "program" presented in the "Appeal of the Crimean Tatar People" (RL MSS, 137) demanded the release of Ivan Yakhimovich, Pavel Litvinov, Larissa Daniel, as well as other political prisoners.

³⁹"Mournful Informatsiya" No. 69 (May 15-June 1, 1968), RL MSS, 396.

⁴⁰See for example Mustafa Sakhat, Letter to the UN Human Rights Commission, RL MSS, 495; and "Appeal of the Crimean Tatar People," May, 1969, RL MSS, 137.

⁴¹Anatole Shub, The New Russian Tragedy (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 22; Grigorenko, Letter about the 1944 deportation, RL MSS, 152.

⁴²Reuter, August 6, 1968.

⁴³Edige Kirimal, "The Crimean Tatars," Studies on the Soviet Union, X (N. S.), No. 1 (1970), pp. 95-96.

⁴⁴"Appeal of the Crimean Tatars in Connection with the Events in the City of Tashkent on August 4-5, 1969," a document written shortly after the trial, cited from "Tashkent Trial," RL MSS, 402. This manuscript, however, gives the number of demonstrators at 20,000; the figure in the text is from Chronicle No. 9 (August, 1969), RL MSS, 260.

⁴⁵Washington Post, April 28, 1970.

⁴⁶Khronika Zashchity Prav v SSSR (Chronicle of the Defense of Rights in the USSR), No. 3 (June-August, 1973) (New York: Khronika Press, 1973), p. 44.

⁴⁷RL MSS, 630; Chronicle No. 25 (May, 1972) (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1972).

⁴⁸RL MSS, 1450 and 1451.

⁴⁹Grigorenko, Letter about the 1944 deportation, RL MSS, 152.

⁵⁰Chronicle No. 27 (October, 1972 (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1973).

⁵¹See, for example, Osmanov's statement about his arrest in May of 1967, autumn, 1968, RL MSS, 85; and "An All-People Protest of the Crimean Tatars," RL MSS, 379.

⁵²P. G. Grigorenko, "In Memory of Alexei Yevgrafovich Kosterin," RL MSS, 109.

⁵³Lenin Bayraghy, April 16, 1970.

⁵⁴Sovet Tojikiston, September 16, 1970, cited in David Nissman, The Resurgence of Islam in Soviet Central Asia as Reflected in Soviet Media in the Summer of 1970 (Munich: Radio Liberty Dispatch, February 17, 1971).

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